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Threaten a reduction on the profit of their money 
and the beast in them awakes with a snarl. 
They become ruthless as savages, brutal as madmen, 
remorseless as executioners.
Dr. Norman Bethune (1939) 2
1. Introduction
 Contemporary China observers tend to agree over the positive role played by post-maoist market-oriented 
reforms in shaping a political system increasingly open to  interactions between private interests and state 
authorities. Recent  works exploring these interactions describe a context  where “pursuit  of  economic expansion 
has led to the emergence of an  interest-based social order” (Zheng 2002: 64) and a polity where “largest and most 
active interest groups are economically driven and have a great impact  on  . . . political and social affairs” (Yang 
2007: 2). 
 In the last  thirty years, Chinese public health  care system has experienced a pervasive restructuring 
process, whose trajectory  has been defined by the State coherently  with national development priorities. As 
reforms in the health sector deepens, private interests are emerging. Despite the deep influence of market-oriented 
reforms in the sector, however, scarce attention has been devoted in investigating policy inputs conveyed by 
economically driven  interests—in  particular those of medical providers and pharmaceutical producers—to the 
political power, either in  the form of resistance to regulatory pressures or through the articulation of specific 
demands. This paper will attempt to  investigate the processes which lead to the constitution of economically 
driven  interests in post-Mao China’s health care sector, how they exerted their influence on the commitments 
taken by the Hu-Wen leadership towards a more “harmonious” pattern of socio-economic development and which 
avenues they might follow in articulating demands upon the political system. Finally, recent  developments in 
health policies and the relevant debate involving major stakeholders will be introduced.
2. Health care sector reforms 1980s - 2000s
 The health care system developed in China during the sixties and the seventies has long been  considered by 
the international community an ‘outstanding example’ in terms of primary health care (WHO 1983: 11). Between 
1952 and 1982, average life expectancy rose from 35 to 68 years, while infant  mortality was reduced from 250 to 
40 deaths every 1,000 live births (Hsiao 1995: 1047). These achievements were possible thanks to a health care 
system focusing on prevention, financed through public resources and guaranteeing universal access to primary 
healthcare.   
 Economic reforms initiated in the early  1980s had a major impact over the health  care sector. The abolition 
of communes caused the collapse of the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) (nongcun yiliao hezuo zhidu), a 
community  based mutual insurance scheme financed and operated at  brigade and commune level. Between 1978 
and 1985, the percentage of insured rural population dropped from 90 percent to  5  percent (Yip, Hsiao 2008: 461). 
In the 1990s, due to the curtailment of workplace benefits, coverage declined also in the cities. In 1998, 56 percent 
of the urban  population  were insured, against  73 percent  of five years before (MoH 1998: 23). In  the mid-1980s, 
public financing of health providers’ current  expenditures—salaries, maintenance, equipments—declined from an 
approximate 50 percent  to  5-10 percent  of total hospital budgets (WHO 1983: 66-67, Sun et al.  2008: 1046). Due 
to the lack of public financing, providers turned to user fees, largely  paid out-of-pocket  by patients. In 1985, 
hospitals were attributed financial autonomy, being allowed to retain the surplus generated through the sale of 
services (Meng 2006: 17). Although the government  retained ownership of the majority  of health providers, 
reliance on user fees and the attribution of financial autonomy resulted in a de-facto privatization of health care 3. 
 Scarce insurance coverage and rising costs caused huge difficulties in accessing health care, a phenomenon 
which in  Chinese goes by the expression of kan  bing nan, kan bing gui, “seeking care is difficult and expensive”. 
In 1993, over 40 percent  of rural residents didn’t have access to hospital treatment  when in need, in most  cases 
due to unaffordability. Impoverishment  due to medical expenditures became common: in  1998, they were causing 
45 percent of the cases of impoverishment in the countryside (MoH 2009a: 46; Liu, Rao, Hsiao 2003: 219). 
 Throughout  the 1980s and most of the 1990s, Chinese leaders seemed convinced that in the long run 
market reforms would play its magic, ‘slowly raising all boats’ , despite warnings  repeatedly launched by the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) (MoH 1993: 64-64; MoH 1998: 132-135). In those years, the shift  towards market 
mechanisms was not uncommon among developing countries. The assumption that only  market  could ensure a 
proper allocation of  the ‘health good’ was consistent  with the neoliberal recipe then advocated on global scale by 
international financial institutions such  as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with social 
concerns subordinated to economic performance. An example of this subordination can be found in the words of 
former prime minister Zhu Rongji  4,  who upon hearing of a MoH proposal to use an earmarked cigarette tax  to 
finance health, stated: “That’s great—we can raise that much revenue from increasing the cigarette tax. That will 
help a great deal with our Three Gorges Dam Project!” (Liu, Rao 2006: 83).  
 In the long run, however, the crisis of the health care sector couldn’t be ignored. Impoverishment  due to 
medical expenditures hampered economic development  in the rural hinterland, while difficulties in  accessing 
health care fueled dissatisfaction among the populace. In late 2002, at  the eve of the the XVI Congress of the 
Communist  Party of China (CPC) which was to  designate Hu Jintao  as general secretary, CPC Central Committee 
and State Council issued the “Decision  on Further Strengthening Rural Health  Care”. This document  redefined the 
rationale of the state’s health intervention  in rural areas as “promoting agricultural economy, protecting the 
development and stability of the rural society” (CPC Central Committee, State Council 2002: Preamble). The 
reform process of the health care system was accelerated by the SARS crisis, which clearly demonstrated how the 
shortcomings of the medical system could result in economic disaster (Saich 2011: 316; Gu 2004: 154) 5. 
 The health reform initiated by the Hu-Wen administration has been  inspired to the goal of delivering 
tangible benefit  to  the most  vulnerable part of the population, coherently with the outline for the construction of a 
“harmonious society”, as well as with the need of ensuring the long-term legitimacy of the régime. As ambassador 
Wang Xuexian stated in his keynote speech during the ASEM Development  Conference 2009: “Employment and 
social security are the key elements to maintain social stability” (Statement # 0422, 2009). Developing a relatively 
efficient  welfare safety net  is seen by  authorities also as a tool to foster internal consumption, so far limited by 
high rates of precautionary saving, especially  in the rural hinterland. This has been a priority for Chinese leaders 
since the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, which reduced demand for Chinese goods in Western 
markets. During the 2010  Davos World Economic Forum, vice premier Li Keqiang—a strong advocate for the 
health reform—recognized that China had been  “excessively reliant on  investment  and export”, stressing the need 
to boost internal demand (BBC News 2010).
 In public statements made by proponents of the health reform, a renewed faith in the role of the public 
institutions as guarantor of the common good can be found, sometimes along with a “nostalgia” for the time when 
the Chinese health care system was considered a model. As Peking University’s economist Li Ling—among the 
most  visible advisors to the government  for health care reform—put  it in an editorial published on  MoH’s Health 
News, “we must rethink development targets [. . .  ] and focus on  people’s happyness: our final goal must be that of 
ensuring to  the people the pursuit  of  happyness [. . . ] and well-being”. In  her editorial, prof. Li also  calls for a 
renewed effort  to reform China’s health care system, which should become “a model for the entire world” (Li 
2010)  
 Rhetoric aside, in the last  few years the share of China’s total health expenditure covered with public 
resources has increased, reaching 47  percent in 2008 (WHO 2011: 128). Additional resources were utilized to a 
large extent to strengthen health  insurance: in 2007, 66 percent  of government  health expenditure was used to 
subsidize government  run insurance schemes (WHO 2009: Table A). In 2008, the portion of insured population 
accounted for the 87 percent of the total, up from 22 percent  in  2003. Wider insurance coverage was achieved 
largely thanks to  the introduction in 2002 of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) (xinxing 
nongcun hezuo yiliao zhidu), which by  2008 was covering 93 percent of  rural residents, or  800 million  people 
(MoH 2009a: 14). According to Dr. Rao  Keqin, head of the Center for Health Statistics and Information of the 
MoH, “So far, the most  important achievement in the health care reform process has been the establishment  of  the 
NRCMS” (Statement  # 1202, 2009). In  urban areas, the Urban Workers Basic Medical Insurance (UWBMI) 
(chengzhen  zhigong jiben yiliao baoxian) was complemented in 2007 by the Urban Residents Basic Medical 
Insurance (URBMI) (chengzhen jumin jiben yiliao baoxian),  targeting children, elderly, unemployed and workers 
of the informal sector 5. By 2008, UWBMI  and URBMI covered 57 percent  of urban population (MoH 2009a: 
14). 
3. Economically driven interests in the health sector
 Payment  of health services in China is commonly based on  a “fee-for-service” (FFS) mechanism, i.e., 
patients are charged for each item they  consume, regardless of their diagnosis 7. Chinese medical price schedule is 
heavily  distorted: tentatives made over the years by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
—in charge for price regulation—to curb medical costs resulted in a situation where most prices for medical 
services are set  at  a level below cost, while providers are free to generate profits from the mark-up on drugs and 
from the provision of hi-tech diagnostic procedures. As a result, service provision is largely  skewed towards the 
prescription of items ensuring high revenues, with  special reference to drugs, which constitute on  average the 
40-50 percent  of hospital revenues (Sun et al. 2008: 1046). To incentive service provision, hospitals provide 
monetary bonuses to physicians on the basis of prescriptions’ value and amount. The more a doctor prescribes, the 
higher will be his/her salary. In a county hospital surveyed by the author in  2008, bonuses allowed doctors to 
double the basic salary—RMB 2,500/month for a clinical physician—provided by the government  8 (Interview 
File # 0418, 2008).
Figure 1 (Above): Screenshot from a digital Hospital Information System (HIS), showing prescriptions made to a patient receiving 
IP  treatment  in a rural  hospital. Near the the top-right margin the value of the advance payment  provided by the patient—RMB 3,800
—can be seen (Author’s picture, Central China, 2010).
 The incentives towards provision of curative services and the distorted price schedule heavily influence 
clinical practice. Over-provision of services in China—for those who can afford  them—is well documented. A 
study  conducted in  1998-99 in  four township health centres (THCs) and eight village clinics concluded that  less 
than two percent  of drug prescriptions were reasonable on medical grounds (Zhang et  al. 2003, in Eggleston et  al. 
2006: 1). According conservative estimates published in  2001, 20-30 percent  of China’s overall health care 
expenditure was spent  on services and drugs whose prescription  was either unreasonable or unnecessary (Zhong 
2001, in Yu et al. 2010: 12). 
  According to  Chinese regulation, medical personnel is forbidden to  “deny emergency treatment” (NPC 
1998: Art. 24). However, in Chinese hospitals treatment  is often denied, delayed or withheld if patients are 
incapable of providing an advance payment, which is required at  the moment of IP  admission. In the case of Mr. 
Feng 9, a farmer living in Inner Mongolia, the amount  of the advance payment was ten times the local average per 
capita one-year income: “Last  year [in 2007] my brother was hit by a car on his way to work. He was badly 
injured. When we arrived to the hospital, they first  visited him, then  asked for an  advance payment  of  30,000 
yuan. Luckily, we were able to put together the money, and he was treated” (Interview File # 0715, 2008). 
According to an expatriate medical professional operating in China, “hospitals often  put up a facade of formal 
compliance with  regulations when patients aren’t  able to pay the deposit. They do provide some sort  of treatment, 
but  this is in  most  cases unappropriate and useless, generally consisting in glucose infusions” (Interview File # 
1013, 2011). Similar situations occur also after the patient  has been admitted: once the advance payment  is 
exhausted, medical personnel require patient’s relatives to  fill in  the deposit, according to an amount  generally 
indicated by a clinical physician. The problem is so  pervasive that in 2009 MoH issued specific regulations over 
the issue, specifying the principle of xian jishi qiuzhi, hou bujiao feiyong “first timely treat, then pay the 
fee” (MoH 2009b, Art. 23). 
 Interests of public health providers are closely tied with those of the pharmaceutical industry, since 
hospitals account  for more than 4/5 of all retail pharmaceutical sales (Sun et  al. 2008: 1046). Since the 1980s, 
when economic reforms allowed drug factories to adjust production plans according to market demand, the 
pharmaceutical sector has been developing at  a rapid pace. In 2005 pharmaceutical manufacturers operating in 
China were 4,600, up from 839 in the early 1980s. The total value of domestic pharmaceutical production rose 
from 10 billions yuan in 1985 to over 446 billion in 2005 (Tang et al.: 3). Once distributed exclusively trough 
wholesalers controlled by the government, drugs can now be sold also directly to health  providers. Sales agents 
often contact  hospital managers and physicians, providing incentives—commissions, kickbacks, gifts—to 
incentive them to purchase or prescribe their products (Yu et al. 2010, pp. 10-11). 
4. Impact of economically driven interests on the Hu-Wen policies 
 Despite the increase in insurance coverage, results of  the health care reform launched by the Hu-Wen 
administration in terms of enhanced accessibility  of health  care services and financial protection against medical 
expenditures have been scarce. According to  a study conducted by the Italian Development  Cooperation and the 
Chinese Ministry  of Health in 2008, involving 11,000 individuals in Central and Western rural China, over 46 
percent  of those who  had been prescribed hospitalization  in the 12 months previous to the survey had not been 
able to  access treatment. In most cases, the reason was the lack of money to purchase the treatment  (89 percent) 
(HCU-MoH 2009: 27) 10 . 
Figure 2 (Above): Inpatient  (IP) services prescription and provision in rural Central  and Western  China, 2008. Only 35 percent of 
those who have been prescribed by a doctor IP  treatment are able to complete the treatment. Other patients in most cases are forced to 
either renounce to IP  treatment (46 percent  of the total) or interrupt it againts medical advice (19 percent), in most cases due to 
unffordability (HCU-MoH 2009: 25-34).
Picture 1  (Above left). Ms. Wang 11 says:  “My son has diabetes and hepatitis. Doctors  tell me I should bring him to the hospital to 
get some treatment. We can’t do that: I am a poor old woman and he can’t work on the fields. How could  we possibly go to the 
hospital?” (Author’s picture, Central China, 2008. Interview File # 0420, 2008).
Picture 2 (Above right). Patient undergoing dialysis session in  a rural hospital. At the time of the author’s visit, cost  of the treatment 
was equal  to RMB 240 for each session. With an average of two session per week—in case of chronic kidney failure—this means a 
cost of RMB 25,000 per year. When the author visited the area, local one year per capita average income was equal to RMB 5,000. 
(Author’s picture, Central China, 2010; Interview File # 0917, 2010)
 Interestingly, according to the same study, being insured or not didn’t  make much  of a difference: no 
significant differences in levels of unmet  health care need between the insured and the uninsured were found. 
Where being insured did  make a difference, however, was in the  amount of out-of-pocket  expenditures. 
Curiously, NRCMS insured patients were more likely to spend in IP treatments a considerable amount  of money 
(≥10  percent  of the household one-year income) than  the uninsured ones, although no evidence of adverse 
selection was found (HCU-MoH 2009: 20-40). These findings are consistent with the results of  a WB research in 
urban areas, which found a significative higher probability  to incur in  catastrophic expenditures among insured 
patients than among uninsured ones (Wagstaff, Lindelow 2008: 10). A study conducted in Guangdong province 
produced similar evidence, finding that  the insured had spent  on average 60  percent  more than the uninsured, 
largely due to  higher costs and quantity of medicined prescribed to them (Pan et al. 2009: 1146). As a senior MoH 
official put  it, health reform so far hasn’t changed the fact  that “health providers are public only  by name. In fact, 
they operate as private institutions”, i.e., pursuing their economic interests (Statement File # 0619, 2009).  
 Reforms have been a good opportunity for pharmaceutical companies to boost  their  revenues. The value of 
the Chinese pharmaceutical market increased threefold between 2004 and 2009, with growth forecasts around 20 
percent/year (Partnering News 2011). According to estimates, public resources allocated under the health reform 
plan 2009-2011—whose characteristics we’ll introduce in paragraph six—produced in  2010 an eight  percent 
growth of the pharmaceutical market, for an estimated 53 billion yuan (Shen 2009:3). 
 Chinese citizens are keenly aware of the contradiction between  Beijing’s commitments and the economic 
interests of the health industry. In a comment posted in the web forum  launched by NDRC in 2008 to collect 
public opinions over the health  reform, a netizen wrote: “Doctors don’t  think  about  the actual condition and needs 
of their patients, but  rather about how to  make more money”12. Significantly, frustration of patients and their 
families doesn’t take the form of organized demonstrations directed towards local authorities—as it  is increasingly 
common with  other issues of public interest—but  rather is revealed by incidents of violence against  medical 
personnel. In 2006 10,000 cases of aggressions were reported, with 5,500 wounded (Xinhua News Agency 2007). 
To deal with episodes of violence, in 2010 police officers were invited to  be the vice-presidents of 27 hospitals in 
Shenyang, a large city  in north eastern China (The Lancet  2010: 657). Hospital admission departments, as well as 
offices of both clinical physicians and administrative personnel, are often protected with metal bars. 
  
 
Picture 3. (Left) Admission office of a county hospital. In Chinese hospitals, violent disputes between patients and medical 
personnel are common. Metal bars often protect administrative offices (Author’s picture, Central China, 2010). 
             
Picture 4. (Right) Department of internal medicine in a county hospital  central  China, 2010. Mr. Wang13 complains: “I’ve been here 
since this morning, already paid a 2,000 yuan, but up to now I still don’t  know what’s wrong with me. You’re a doctor, right?  So why 
don’t you come here and tell me?” (Author’s picture, Central China, 2010).
5. Resistance to regulatory pressures and platforms for interest articulation
 The capacity of single individuals and institutions to resist  policy and regulatory pressures  has been widely 
documented in  communist polities and China in particular (Skilling 1966: 436; Burns 1988: 32; Hook 1996: 4). 
Selective provision  of services and selective compliance with regulations among Chinese health care providers, 
illustrated in  the third paragraph, are a clear example of this resistance(s), expressing an orientation opposed to 
the policies inspiring the role of the state in terms of health care provision under the Hu-Wen leadership. 
 Building on the existing literature analyzing the interactions between private interests and public authorities 
in other areas of China’s economic, social and political life, it  is possible to outline platforms for interest 
articulation  in the health care sector  14. At this regard, based on different  structure and constituencies, we can 
distinguish between institutional, associational and corporate interest groups 15. 
 The major institutional group comprises of managers and physicians working in  public hospitals. Hospitals 
are, in  fact, part  of a bureaucratic apparatus attached to government  and party authorities. Hospital managers are 
effective in  lobbying government  departments to gain access to financial resources, often acting outside any  kind 
of formal coordination by  local health authorities. On a broader perspective, hospitals have influenced the policy 
dialogue nationwide, mainly through MoH’s institutional channels. Complaints of physicians about poor working 
conditions and low salaries have been consistent  throughout  the years, acquiring a relevant position in the current 
debate on health  care reform (Pye 1996: 38; Qiu 2009: 11). According to  a well-informed source, “doctors and 
hospitals are MoH’s constituency, the basis of its power. When Zhang Wenkang [ex minister  of health, sacked for 
the mismanagement  of the SARS crisis]declared ‘I’m not  the CEO in charge of public hospitals, I’m the CEO in 
charge for the well-being of 1.3 billion people!’ he was harshly criticised, and forced a few months later to correct 
his statement. This demonstrate how MoH must  be careful dealing with  doctors’ interests” (Interview File  # 0730, 
2011).  
 Key actors of Chinese health  industry are grouped in various organizations, such as the Chinese Hospital 
Association, the China Insurance Association, the China Pharmaceutical Commerce Association. These groupings 
mostly fit  into the description  of state-corporatist organizations, working as a consultative arm of the government 
(Unger, Chan  1995: 37-51; Thompson 2009: 64). Associations, however, at  times can convey upwards requests 
and opinions, formulated either by their own constituencies or by actors affected by decisions being taken at 
higher levels. According to a senior pharmaceutical marketing manager, “Associations are very important 
channels of communication between the government  and businesses. In many cases, their leadership is chosen 
directly by the associates, effectively representing the interests of businesses included in  the 
association” (Interview File # 1130, 2011).
 Other than into institutional and associational groups, interests can coalescence into corporate interests 
groups. Corporate pressures, through either legal or illegal avenues—lobbying, kickbacks, bribes—have been 
widely documented with reference to the pharmaceutical industry. In 2007 Zheng Xiaoyu, director of the Chinese 
State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), was executed after being found guilty of receiving bribes to 
smoothen  approval of  drugs not  complying with mandatory quality and safety standards (BBC News 2007). 
Dynamics of interest  articulation in other key regulatory areas, such as the definition of indicative retail prices for 
drugs—responsibility of NDRC—and the inclusion of drugs into the formularies of items reimbursable by the 
government health insurances—NRCMS, URBMI and UWBMI, for which are in charge respectively the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MoHRSS)—are more difficult  to 
ascertain. However, while new measures of drug pricing reform were being discussed by top  leaders in  2009, 
“intense discussions” reportedly went on behind the scene (Shen 2009: 3). It  must  be noted that, due to the 
considerable fragmentation of the Chinese pharmaceutical market—where none of the top ten pharmaceutical 
companies controls more than  2.5 percent  of the market—neither international MNCs or biggest  domestic firms 
are in a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position, a condition which in other sectors allows major enterprises 
to articulate successfully their interests  (KPMG 2011: 20, 28; Naughton 2009: 7-8; Yang 2007: 2-5). This said, 
market’s structure will probably evolve towards an increased concentration in the near future, as major mergers 
and acquisitions are occurring at  a rapid pace (PWC 2009: 22).  In the first  half of 2011, various collaborations 
were established between domestic producers and foreign MNCs, including Pfizer, Novartis, Daichi Sankyo, 
Takeda.
 In the Chinese context, direct  contact between interested parties and their regulators has been documented 
to be one of the most common forms of interest articulation  (Kennedy 2005: 3). Considering the almost symbiotic 
ties often existing between government and business, strengthened after Jiang Zemin opened party  ranks to 
entrepreneurs a decade ago, this finding is not surprising. Interest  articulation through personal connections and 
elite representation—i.e., presence of a group member in the policy making structure or sympathetic 
representation by an elite figure (Almond, Powell 1966: 83)—seems to be likely patterns for putting demands 
upon the political system in the health sector. With special reference to the pharmaceutical sector, personal 
connections are fostered also through departments for governmental affairs—which inside pharmaceutical 
companies are specifically entrusted with smoothing relations with authorities—whose operations are considered 
necessary  prerequisites to run a profitable business. “Without  such departments”, says a well-informed source, 
“there is no way to close good deals” (Interview File # 1130, 2011).
6. The 2009-2011 health reform plan: Contents, debate and resistance
 In 2009 Beijing launched a new phase of the health reform. Priority has been once again attributed to the 
government-run health insurance sector, which  received 2/3 of the 850 billion yuan earmarked for the plan in the 
period 2009-2011. Besides additional resources for the insurance sector, the plan also envisages the establishment 
of a new set  of regulations pertinent to drugs prescription and hospital management  (State Council 2009). By late 
2010, over 300 “essential drugs” were listed by MoH. According to the new regulation, physicians employed in 
the lowest  tiers of the health care provision network—village clinics (cun weishengshi), township health centres 
(xiang  weishengyuan), community health centres  (shequ weisheng fuwu zhongxin)—should exclusively prescribe 
drugs included in the list. New measures also require the gradual abolition of the mark-up on the price of drugs. 
To compensate losses, local authorities have been required to  gradually increase subsidies to cover current 
expenditures of hospitals. As for hospital management, the plan focuses on curbing the rise in medical 
expenditures and avoiding over-prescription. MoH has developed 112 clinical protocols, which are being piloted 
in over 100 public providers, showing encouraging results in reducing average costs for IP  treatments (Jiankang 
Bao 2010).
 Not  surprisingly, the reaction  of the pharmaceutical industry and medical providers hasn’t been 
enthusiastic. Short  before reform measures were disclosed in early 2009, Pharma China—a business media based 
in the US, tied to the consulting firm Wicon International—published a long editorial, whose central paragraph 
read “Top priority of Chinese healthcare reform should not be cost containment” (Shen 2009: 2). In the first 
months of 2010, debate previously  kept  behind the scenes went  public: Commenting on the health reform plan 
during the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2010, the delegate Zong 
Licheng, manager of a pharmaceutical company, openly criticized the measures aimed at curbing medical costs 
(Nanfang Zhoumo 2010a). Also public hospitals expressed discomfort. According to a hospital director named Hu 
Siming,  “even if the prescription of certain treatments isn’t ethically justifiable, hospital and doctors must find 
some way to survive” (Nanfang Zhoumo 2010b). While discussing with the author, the director of a prefecture 
hospital located in central China defined the reform plan as “idealistic” (Interview File #  0520, 2010). Local 
authorities seem to share this attitude. A representative of a provincial health department  repeatedly expressed to 
the author skepticism over the economic sustainability of hospital operations under the new restrictive framework 
regulating drugs’ prescription and clinical procedures (Interview File # 0925, 2009). 
 Passive resistance to  regulations seems likely to continue along the usual patterns. According to an ex 
pharmaceutical marketing manager, “hospital will try to avoid restrictions, continuing to prescribe unnecessary 
treatments and items not yet subject to strict  government  regulation” (Interview File #  0221, 2011). According to 
another medical source, “the proposed measures [on the abolition of mark up  on drugs] could lead to illegal 
arrangements between drugs manufacturers and hospitals: the wholesale price of drugs could be artificially 
increased, so as to  make up at  least partially  for the financial losses caused by the ban of mark up” (Interview File 
# 1014, 2009).
 
7.Conclusions
 In February, 2011, while addressing a national meeting on health reform, Chinese vice-premier Li Keqiang 
said that in  2011 “the country would fight  the toughest  battle to reform the health care system” (People’s Daily 
Online 2011). Li’s words seem to confirm the difficulties encountered by  Beijing in  pushing ahead the most 
controversial elements of the health reform, with special reference to the hospital management reform, whose 
progress has been so far reportedly slow.  
 China faces enormous challenges with respect  to health care, likely to  become even more daunting in the 
coming years due to the rapid aging of the population. The capacity of its health care system to ensure equitable 
access to  safe and effective health  services will largely  depend upon the interactions between social needs, 
political power and economic interests. The latter—which developed during the 1980s and 1990s—in the Hu-Wen 
era have considerably  curtailed the space of maneuver of state’s authorities, resisting the implementation of 
policies which  they perceived as detrimental to their economic interests. Should these interests achieve 
considerable influence over the current  health  care reform process, the outcome of China’s transition—at  least in 
this area—could be different  from the one advocated by many  China scholars and observers: policy making could 
become responsive to powerful private interests, rather than accountable to society at large. 
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Perspective”, prepared by the author for the conference Globalization and Public Sector Reforms in China and India, held  at 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS) on September 23-24, 2011, 
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septicemia, probably contracted  performing surgery on a wounded Chinese soldier. He is still remembered and celebrated in China 
among revolutionary heroes
3 Village—the lowest tier of the Chinese health care system—is the only layer of the health care provision network where a 
considerable portion of providers  privatization went  to  its full  extent. By 1998, 40 percent of village clinics  were independent and 
private practices (Liu et al. 2006: 241).
4 Chinese premier between 1998 and 2003.
5 According to  WHO, between November 2002—when first cases were detected in Guangdong province—and August 2003, SARS 
cases worldwide were 8,422, with 916 deaths (WHO 2003). The ‘People’s War to SARS’  declared by President Hu Jintao in early 
2003  (Perry 2007: 15) is often considered the ridge between the ‘old’, market-oriented health policies  and the ‘new’  course initiated 
with the ‘fourth generation of leaders’.
6 While NRCMS and URBMI premiums are heavily subsidized by the government, with a flat rate contribution paid by the single 
enrollee, UWBMI is  financed by  the worker and the employer. On average, UWBMI insurance premiums amount to 8 percent of the 
annual salary, 2 percent provided by the worker and 6 percent by the employer. 
7 In most western  countries ‘fee-for-service’  (FFS) mechanisms have been replaced by per-case based, forfeit payment systems. 
Among these systems, the most  widely used to determine cost for inpatient (IP) services is based on Diagnosis Related Groups 
(DRGs). DRGs classify patients into major diagnostic categories. Each of these categories groups together diagnoses whose 
treatment should consume a similar amount of resources. The introduction of DRGs is typically intended as a mechanism to incentive 
providers to economize, and have proven to a large extent effective. Since the actual costs  incurred by the hospital are not  taken into 
account, DRGs requires the adoption of well-defined treatment protocols. Per-case payment mechanisms have been tested in many 
Chinese hospitals in the last few years, as MoH called for the experimentation of payment mechanism based on patients‘ diagnoses. 
8 In October 2011, 1RMB = US$ 0.16; EUR 0.11. In the same area, average income for peasants was around RMB 3,000 per capita 
per year.
9 Fictitious name.
10 The author took part in the study, providing operative, scientific and field coordination on behalf of the Italian counterpart. The 
results of the study have been published in 2009 at http://saluteinternazionale.info/2009/09/riforma-sanitaria-in-cina-lo-stato-dellarte/ 
[Italian language].
11  Fictitious name.
12 In October, 2011 the comment was still accessible at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/ygyj/ygyj_detail.jsp?comId=31240.
13 Fictitious name.
14 See Kennedy 2005: 1-24, Yang 2007: 2-5.
15 To describe the concept of “interest group”, we refer to the definition given by Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell: “group of 
individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds” (Almond, 
Powell 1966: 75).
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